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ALIENs-NATIoNA=TY-ExPATPzTIoN.-The petitioner, a French citizen, born
in 1878, had completed his active military service in France. By law he auto-
matically passed into the reserve army in i9o2 and into the territorial army in
i9r2. In I9o3 he removed to Switzerland and became naturalized there in i9o9,
without having obtained the consent of the French Government. The French
law provides that such consent is necessary for expatriation up to the time a
Frenchman passes into the territorial army. The petitioner was called into the
French army in 1915, and claimed to be no longer a French citizen on the ground
that at least after 1912, when by law he passed into the territorial army, govern-
mental consent to expatriation became unnecessary. Held, that his expatriation
was void ab initio and that the defect .was not cured by the fact that after 1912
he could have expatriated himself by naturalization abroad without the French
Government's consent In re Coutarel (Tribunal Civil des Sables d'Olonne,
May 30, I916), reported in (917) 44 CLUXET, i88.
B~w:uw cY-REFERENcs-RcouiwxG WITHIN FoUR MoNTHs' PERoID.-As
security for a contemporaneous loan the debtor executed a mortgage upon his
stock of merchandise at Macon, Georgia, on February 16, 1914. The mortgage
was not recorded until August 2o, 1914, at a time when the mortgagee knew of
the debtor's insolvency. The following day an involuntary petition in bank-
ruptcy was filed against the debtor. Recording was not fraudulently delayed and
prior thereto no other liens were fixed upon the property. The local statute
(Ga. Code igio, sec. 326o) imposed the requirements of recording only in
favor of a creditor who fixes a lien upon the property before the recording takes
place. The trustee in bankruptcy sought to avoid the mortgage as a preferential
transfer by virtue of sections 6ob and 47a of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended.
Held, that the mortgage was valid, since no one concerned in the distribution of
the estate held rights superior to the mortgage prior to its record. Martin v.
Commercial Nat. Bank (i918) 38 Sup. Ct 176.
While previous decisions of the Supreme Court had foreshadowed this
decision, it is satisfactory to have the precise point determined by the court of
final authority.
CoNFncT OF LAws-JuRIsDIcTIoN FOR DIvoRc-A German subject had
married a French woman in France in 1911, where the matrimonial domicile was
located. On the outbreak of war, he deserted her to join the armies of Ger-
many. The woman brought an action for divorce in France. According to the
law of Germany and of France, she became a German subject by marriage.
The court appeared uncertain whether the case .should be governed by the
Hague Convention of June 12, i9O2 (in force in Germany but abrogated in
France), and whether under that Convention jurisdiction in divorce was con-
current between the courts of the country of nationality and those of the
domicile or was vested solely in the national courts, provided the law of the
nationality excluded the jurisdiction of the courts of the matrimonial domicile.
Held, that the French courts of the place where the marriage was celebrated
ar.l of the matrimonial domicile would assume jurisdiction (without examining
whether the German law excludes the jurisdiction of the courts of the
matrimonial domicile, or whether there were courts in Germany competent
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to entertain an action for divorce when the .wife was domiciled and resident
abroad), since otherwise under existing war conditions the woman would find
herself without access to competent judges and would suffer a denial of justice.
Hamacher v. Duval (Civil Tribunal of Boulogne, March ig, 1915), reported in
(1917) 44 CLUNEr, 179.
CONSTITUTIONAL LA~W-DuE PROCESS OF LAw-ERROR OF TRIAL CouRT.-In an
action of ejectment brought in a federal district court, the trial judge received
in evidence, as tending to establish title in the plaintiff, the records of certain
previous suits resulting in judicial sales of tracts of land belonging to the pre-
decessors in title of the present defendant The plaintiff claimed title through
these proceedings. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the defendant contended that the premises in question were not involved in the
previous suits, and also that the defendant was not bound by the decrees in those
suits, and that the admission of such incompetent evidence and the rendering
of judgment for the plaintiff on the strength of it were such error as to amount
to a violation of the defendant's rights under the "due process clause" of the
Fifth Amendment. Held, that, whether or not the evidence was incompetent,
"error of a trial judge in admitting evidence or entering judgment after a full
hearing does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Jones v. Buffalo
Creek Coal & Coke Co. (1917, U. S.) 38 Sup. Ct 121.
It is to be noted that the trial court here was a federal court For a discus-
sion of denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by errors of a
state court, see (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 121. The fact that this case
comes up under the Fifth Amendment should not, without more, differentiate it,
since, in respect to what constitutes due process, the two amendments should
be interpreted identically. Taylor, Due Process of Law, sec. 123' Twining v.
New Jersey (9o8) 211 U. S. 78, 101; 29 Sup. Ct 14, 20.
CONTRACTS-EFFECT OF 'WAR CLAUSE" PROVIDING FOR SUSPENSION IN TIME
OF WAR-In a contract for the sale and delivery of merchandise, concluded
prior to the outbreak of war, there 3vas a clause providing that the vendor had
the privilege of suspending delivery if war should break out, and, after a
certain period, of terminating the entire contract. In an action for failure
to make deliveries, the defendant, relying on this clause, alleged the fact that
war had supervened. The plaintiff replied that the defendant's refusal to carry
out the contract was prompted by business reasons. Held, that the clause was
valid and that the defendant's motive in cancelling the contract was immaterial.
Milne & Co. v. Phosphates Tunisiens (Court of Paris, 3d Chamber, July 27,
i916), reported in (1917) 44 CLUNET, 167.
A similar contract containing the "war clause" above mentioned was con-
cluded after the outbreak of war. The vendor, relying upon the clause, broke
the contract. Held, that the condition provided for in the "war clause" was
inoperative, inasmuch as the war actually prevailed when the contract was
made. Doughty Sons and Richardson v. Phosphates Tunsiens (Court of Paris,
3d Chamber, July 27, i916), reported in (1917) 44 CLUNET, 171.
For a discussion of a recent American case involving a somewhat analogous
contract see (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 408.
CORPORATIONS-PROHIBITIoN AGAINST PRACTICING LAW-FURNISHING ATTORNEY
TO DRAT WILL.-Section 280 of the New York Penal Law makes it unlawful
for a corporation to practice law or "to furnish attorneys or counsel or to
render legal services of any kind in actions or proceedings of any nature or in
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any other way or manner." The defendant trust company advertised that it
would give advice concerning the making of wills and the appointment of
executors. When an application was made for such advice, a clerk of the
defendant summoned by telephone an attorney retained by the defendant, who
drafted a will for the customer, making the defendant executor. No charge
was made to the customer for this service. Held, that the defendant was guilty
of a violation of the statute. Peopli v. People's Trust Co. (1917, App. Div.) 167
N. Y. SupP. 767.
The statute is prolix and blindly drawn and the meaning of the words above
quoted is obscured rather than aided by reading them in their context. Some
parts of the section would seem to indicate that it referred only to services or
advice in connection with suits or proceedings before courts or other tribunals.
Other provisions, however, tend to support the broader interpretation which the
court gave to the section. As applied to the particular case the statute at first
sight may appear somewhat drastic. It was obvious, however, that the induce-
ment to the defendant to make such an arrangement was the hope or expecta-
tion of being named as executor in return for its courtesy to the customer, and
the court justifies the prohibition on the ground that the situation thus created
did not conduce to the undivided allegiance which a client should receive from
his attorney.
EvxDENcE-ADMissIoNs-TRANsFER OF PROPERTY AS ADMISSION OF LIABILITY.-
The plaintiff sued for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the driver
of the defendant's jitney. The defendant claimed that the driver at the time
was on "a frolic of his own," and was not acting within the scope of his
employment in driving over the route where the accident happened. The plaintiff
brought out by cross-examination of the defendant that he transferred his
property to his wife immediately after the accident. Held, that the evidence
was admissible as evidence of the defendant's consciousness that he was legally
liable. Chaufty v. DeVries (1918, R. I.) lo2 Atl. 612.
As indicated by the cases cited in the opinion, there is a conflict of authority
on the admissibility of such evidence. It is true that a transfer of property
might be made without any consciousness of liability, as for example, simply
to avoid the inconvenience of having the property tied up during a threatened
suit. But on the other hand, the defendant has an opportunity to explain his
conduct, and while the court should no doubt proceed with caution, and each
case should be considered on its own facts, it would seem that in many cases
such evidence might have sufficient probative value to justify its admission
under proper instructions. For a discussion of the admissibility of verbal
admissions of liability see (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 277.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-TRADING WITH THE ENEiMY.-Section I of the German
legislative decree of Sept. 30, 1914, forbids payments to Great Britain or her
colonies, directly or indirectly. The defendant, a partner (nationality not
stated) of a firm in Punta Arenas, Chile, while resident in Germany, directed
his firm in Chile by telegram to pay a debt owed by the firm to a British
creditor. Held, that the defendant in Germany in effect directed the transfer
of a part of his partnership funds located in Chile, to Great Britain, and hence
was guilty of violating the decree mentioned. ln re Elkan, reported in (1917)
44 CLUNETr, 255, from an account of the case tried in the court of first instance
(probably Aintsgericht) of Berlin, given in the Frankfurter Zeitung of June
19, 1916.
The prosecution contended that the decree prohibited any act which might
increase the national resources of Great Britain, and that the prohibition
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extended to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of Germany, whether
nationals or aliens, neutral or enemy; and that the legislative decree applied
not only to the transfer of money from Germany, but from any foreign country
as well. The defense contended that German legislation could not prohibit
valid legal relations between two foreign countries or the fulfillment of obliga-
tions contracted by subjects of foreign states not to be performed in Germany.
The court took the view that one element of the offense, the direction to pay,
had taken place within the jurisdiction of Germany, and that this sufficed to
bring the defendant within the penalty fixed by the decree.
LIMIrrATION OF ACTIONS-SET-OFF OF BARRED DEBT BY ADMINISTRATOR AGAINST
DISTRruEE.-The intestate at the time of her death had a claim against her son
which was barred by the statute of limitations. One of the distributees brought
suit to settle the estate, contending that the debt should be charged against the
son's distributive share. Held, that the barred debt was not properly the subject
of set-off against the son's share of the estate. Luscher v. Security Trust Co.
(ig8, Ky.) igg S. W. 613.
By this decision Kentucky is added to the growing list of states which refuse
to permit the share of a legatee or distributee to be reduced by a statute-barred
debt-contrary to the English decisions and those of certain American courts.
For a discussion of the subject see (igi6) 26 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 236.
NEGLIGENcE-LIABrLITY OF MANUFACTURER TO THIRD PARTmS-FAnuaR To
WARN OF DETERIORATION OF PRoDuCT.-The defendant manufactured a food
product for infants and invalids which he knew or should have known was
likely to deteriorate by time or manner of keeping after leaving his hands. The
infant plaintiff's mother purchased a can of the food from a retailer to whom
the defendant had sold it. The plaintiff was injured by eating the food, which
had deteriorated. Held, that the defendant was chargeable with negligence
in failing to affix to the package the date of manufacture and the time
during which the ingredients might safely be used, or the manner in which
they should be handled and preserved to prevent deterioration. Rosenbusch v.
Ambrosia Milk Corporation (1917, N. Y. App. Div.) 168 N. Y. Supp. 5o5.
This is an interesting and novel, but it is believed a sound, extension of the
principles upon which manufacturers are held liable in tort to remote vendees
or consumers of the manufactured product. See (1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL,
281.
NEGLIGENCE-PROxIMATE CAUSE-VOLUNTARY INTERVENTION OF PLAINTIFF'S
INTESTATE.-The defendant's driver left its horse untied near a railroad platform.
The horse wandered on to the platform and fell. The station master, the
plaintiff's intestate, helped the horse to its feet and led him off the platform
but did not tie him. The horse wandered back upon the platform and again
fell. In attempting a second time to raise the horse the station master received
injuries which proved fatal. A judgment dismissing the complaint was affirmed
by the Appellate Division. Held, that the intervention of the deceased did not
prevent the defendant's negligence from being the proximate cause of the acci-
dent and that the case should have been submitted to the jury. Chase and
Cuddeback, JJ., dissenting. Donnelly v. H. C. & A. L Piercy Contracting Co.
(1918, N. Y.) 118 N. E. 6o5.
On the general subject of liability to volunteers, see (igi8) 27 YALm L&w
JOURNA , 415.
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PATENTS-RESTRAINT oF TRADE-PiucE RESTUC0ioNS oN RESALE op PATExTED
ARricxrE.-The principal complainant was the owner of certain patents, under
which it manufactured graphophones, records, etc.; the other complainant was
its selling agent. The complainants undertook to control the resale prices of
the principal complainant's products through contracts made by the selling
agent with all purchasers of the products, by which such purchasers agreed to
maintain the resale prices established from time to time by the complainants.
The respondent, having signed such a contract, resold at less than the estab-
lished prices goods purchased under the contract The complainants sued in a
federal District Court for an injunction against further violations of the resale
provisions of the contract. Held, that the price-fixing contract relied on was
void and unenforcible. Holmes and Van Devanter, JJ., dissenting. Boston
Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Company (March 4, i918) U..S.
Sup. Ct Oct Term, No. 363.
The actual decision adds little to what had been settled by prior cases, but
the opinion is interesting for its review and interpretation of the previous
decisions, and for the very broad statement of the rules which it deduces
from them. On the general subject see (1917) 27 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 288,
and other references there given; also (1918) 27 ibid. 397. Mr. Justice
Holmes persists in the dissent which he has registered in all the resale cases.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, on the other hand, filed a brief concurring opinion, stating
that whether such contracts should be permitted was an economic question,
which should be decided by consideration of industrial and commercial facts,
rather than established legal principles; that his personal views on the question
were not in accord with those of the majority; but that he considered the law
as settled for the court by the series of previous decisions relied on by the
majority. Besides pointing out that a remedy had already been sought through
application to Congress (evidently referring to a pending bill for which he him-
self, before his appointment to the bench, was one of the sponsors) he further
intimated that relief might possibly be given by the Federal Trade Commission.
PLEDGEs-Loss OF LIEN-SURRENDER o BILL or LADING BY PLEDGEE ON AccEPT-
Ac op DRAFT.-The petitioner discounted a time bill drawn by a consignor of
goods upon the consignee, the bill of lading being attached to the bill of exchange
The bill was duly accepted by the consignee and the bill of lading was sur-
rendered to him. The acceptor and the drawer of the bill both became insol-
vent, and the former returned to the latter the specific goods in question in part
satisfaction of general claims due the latter. Held, that by surrendering the bill
of lading to the consignee upon acceptance of the bill of exchange, the petitioner
lost his lien upon the specific goods and had no equitable lien thereon in case
they were returned to the consignor. Helburn Thompson Co. v. All Americas
Merc. Corp. (1917, App. Div.) 167 N. Y. Supp. 711.
The result of this decision is that the consignor is now in possession of both
the goods and the price. There is no injustice in this, however, for the equity
of the petitioner is no stronger than that of any other creditor of the consignor.
He surrendered his lien by delivery of the bill of lading, as was contemplated
originally. Thereafter he has no more interest in these goods than in any other
goods of the consignee which might have been applied on the latter's indebted-
ness to the consignor.
PRAcrcE-DEcLARToRY JU MENTS-P-OWER To DEcLARE RIGHTS WrrHouT
GRAING OTHER RELrEF.-The petitioner was the devisee under the will of her
father of certain real estate, devised to her, "her heirs and assigns forever." The
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testator by his will ordered and directed that the devisee should at her expense
provide for the maintenance and support of her two brothers during their
natural lives. The petitioner sought to have the court declare, under a statute
of 1915 giving "any person claiming a right cognizable in a court of equity,
under a deed, will, or other written instrument [the privilege of applying] for
the determination of any question of construction thereof," that she was seized
in fee simple of the land, free from any charge thereon arising out of the direc-
tion to support her brothers. She asked for no other relief. Held, that the
petitioner was entitled to obtain a declaration of her rights under the will, even
though not incidental to a request for equitable relief, as the statute was not
meant to be merely declaratory of existing law, but to be remedial In re
Ungaro's Will (1917, N. J. Ch.) IO2 AtL 244.
This appears to be one of the few American cases in which a departure has
been recognized from the orthodox view that the aid of a court for the purpose
of construction or for the purpose of declaring rights cannot be invoked in the
absence of any concomitant request for coercive relief. An article by Profes-
sor Borchard, of the Yale School of Law, on the subject of declaratory judg-
ments from the point of view of comparative law will be published in an early
number of the YAm LAW JoURNAL.
Punuc SERvicE ComFANms-RQurRm:ExT OF UNPRoFTABr.E SmvicE-DUE
PROCESS OF LAw.-After a proper hearing, the New York Public Service Com-
mission ordered the plaintiff in error, a gas company, to extend its mains so
as to supply a thriving district located a mile and a half beyond its nearest
mains but within the territory included in its franchise. The company claimed
that the order was confiscatory, and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
since the extension, in itself, would not yield a fair return, though it was not
claimed that the general business of the company would not continue profitable.
Held, that no constitutional right of the plaintiff in error was violated by the
order. People ex. rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall (1917) 38 Sup.
Ct I22
The soundness of the decision itself is hardly open to controversy. The
language of the court, however, to the effect that public service companies may
not "pick and choose," serving only the most profitable portions of the territory
covered by their franchises, and leaving the rest without service, obscures the
real issue, which is not between the company and the applicants for service,
but between the different portions of the community. It would be more
accurate to say that within reasonable limits, for the good of the whole
community, one portion must often pay temporarily, and sometimes per-
manently, a part of the cost of serving the rest. Unless the company could
thus shift the burden, the requirement of the unprofitable service would be
clearly confiscatory. The application of the principle depends, of course, on
questions of fact, of reasonableness, and of balance of public benefit,--typically
the sort of questions which public service commissions are created to determine.
